Corruption and Social Structure: Theory, and Evidence from India

Corruption often poses a collective action problem: citizens or firms may each pay bribes in an effort to obtain preferential treatment, but would all benefit from a mutual commitment not to bribe. If they can sanction each other in other games, then by "linking" the games they may be able...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Christopher Kingston
Format: Printed Book
Published: BREAD Working Paper No. 075 2004
Online Access:http://10.26.1.76/ks/001040.pdf
LEADER 010880000a22001330004500
100 |a Christopher Kingston 
245 |a Corruption and Social Structure: Theory, and Evidence from India 
260 |c 2004 
260 |b BREAD Working Paper No. 075 
520 |a Corruption often poses a collective action problem: citizens or firms may each pay bribes in an effort to obtain preferential treatment, but would all benefit from a mutual commitment not to bribe. If they can sanction each other in other games, then by "linking" the games they may be able to overcome this "briber'sdilemma". Corruption will be less common in societies with an "integrated" social structure, in which individuals interact with different people for different purposes, than in a "collectivist" society in which people interact mainly within close-knit groups. We provide several examples and carry out an empirical test using Indian data to support the model.  
856 |u http://10.26.1.76/ks/001040.pdf 
942 |c KS 
999 |c 70428  |d 70428 
952 |0 0  |1 0  |4 0  |7 0  |9 62392  |a MGUL  |b MGUL  |d 2015-08-01  |l 0  |r 2015-08-01  |w 2015-08-01  |y KS 

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